IN this Sutta the Buddha, in conversation with a naked ascetic, explains his position as regards asceticism—so far, that is, as is compatible with his invariable method (as represented in the Dialogues) when discussing a point on which he differs from his interlocutor.
When speaking on sacrifice to a sacrificial priest, on union with God to an adherent of the current theology, on Brahman claims to superior social rank to a proud Brahman, on mystic insight to a man who trusts in it, on the soul to one who believes in the soul theory, the method followed is always the same. Gotama puts himself as far as possible in the mental position of the questioner. He attacks none of his cherished convictions. He accepts as the starting-point of his own exposition the desirability of the act or condition prized by his opponent—of the union with God (as in the Tevijja), or of sacrifice (as in the Kūṭadanta), or of social rank (as in the Ambaṭṭha), or of seeing heavenly sights, &c. (as in the Mahāli), or of the soul theory (as in the Poṭṭhapāda). He even adopts the very phraseology of his questioner. And then, partly by putting a new and (from the Buddhist point of view) a higher meaning into the words; partly by an appeal to such ethical conceptions as are common ground between them; he gradually leads his opponent up to his conclusion. This is, of course, always Arahatship—that is the sweetest fruit of the life of a recluse, that is the best sacrifice, that the highest social rank, that the best means of seeing heavenly sights, and a more worthy object; and so on. In our Sutta it is the path to Arahatship which is the best asceticism.
There is both courtesy and dignity in the method employed. But no little dialectic skill, and an easy mastery of the ethical points involved, are required to bring about the result. On the hypothesis that the Buddha is a sun myth, and his principal disciples personifications of the stars, [\q 207/] the facts seem difficult to explain. One would expect, then, something quite different. How is it that the other disciples who must, in that case, have concocted these Dialogues, refrain so entirely from astrological and mythological details? How is it they attribute to their hero qualities of courtesy and sympathy, and a grasp of ethical problems, all quite foreign, even antagonistic, to those usually ascribed to sun-heroes—mostly somewhat truculent and very unethical personages?
On the hypothesis, that he was an historical person, of that training and character he is represented in the Piṭakas to have had, the method is precisely that which it is most probable he would have actually followed.
Whoever put the Dialogues together may have had a sufficiently clear memory of the way he conversed, may well have even remembered particular occasions and persons. To the mental vision of the compiler, the doctrine taught loomed so much larger than anything else, that he was necessarily more concerned with that, than with any historical accuracy in the details of the story. He was, in this respect, in much the same position as Plato when recording the dialogues of Socrates. But he was not, like Plato, giving his own opinions. We ought, no doubt, to think of compilers, rather than of a compiler. The memory of co-disciples had to be respected, and kept in mind. And so far as the actual doctrine is concerned our Dialogues are probably a more exact reproduction of the thoughts of the teacher than the dialogues of Plato.
However this may be, the method followed in all these Dialogues has one disadvantage. In accepting the position of the adversary, and adopting his language, the authors compel us, in order to follow what they give us as Gotama’s view, to read a good deal between the lines. The argumentum ad hominem can never be the same as a statement of opinion given without reference to any particular person. That is strikingly the case with our present Sutta.
When addressing his five hearers—the Pañcavaggiyā, the first five converts, and the first Arahats—in the Deer-park at Benares, on the occasion of his first discourse, the Buddha is represented to have spoken of asceticism in a very different way. He there calls it one of ‘two extremes which are to be avoided’; and describes it as ‘painful, unworthy, and unprofitable.’  So in the Puggala Paññatti (IV, 24) the very practices set out in our Sutta, by Kassapa the ascetic, [\q 208/] as desirable and praiseworthy, are set out as the actions by which a man injures himself. There is nothing of this sort in our Sutta. To judge from it alone one might fairly conclude that the Buddha approved of asceticism, only insisting that the self-mastery and self-control of the Path were the highest and best forms of it. There is really no inconsistency in these three Suttas. But while the first discourse and the Puggala passage were both addressed to disciples, our Sutta is addressed to an ascetic, and the language used is modified accordingly. The conclusion in all is exactly the same.
It is clear that at the time when our Sutta was put together the practice of self-mortification had already been carried out to a considerable extent in India. And further details, in some of which the self-imposed penances are even more extreme, are given in other Dialogues of the same date, notably in the twelfth Sutta of the Majjhima. This is oddly enough also called a Sīhanāda Sutta, and the reason is not far to seek.
The carrying out of such practices, in all countries, wins for the ascetic a very high reputation. Those who despise earthly comforts, and even submit themselves to voluntary torture, are looked upon, with a kind of fearsome wonder, as more holy than other men. And no doubt, in most cases, the ascetics laid claim to special virtue. In the Suttas dealing with the practices of the ascetics, Gotama, in laying stress on the more moderate view, takes occasion also to dispute this claim. He maintains, as in our Sutta, that the insight and self-control and self-mastery of the Path, or of the system of intellectual and moral self-training laid down for the Bhikkhu, are really harder than the merely physical practices so much more evident to the eye of the vulgar. It was a point that had to be made. And the Suttas in which it is made are designated as Sīhanādas, literally ‘the lion’s roars’—the proud claim by the Arahat to a dignity and veneration greater than that allowed by the people to the self-torturer or even to the man who
‘Bescorched, befrozen, lone in fearsome woods,
Naked, without a fire, afire within,
Struggled, in awful silence, towards the goal !’
And the boast goes really even further. Not only were the ascetics no better than the Arahats, they were even not so practical. The self-mortification was an actual hindrance. It turned men’s minds from more essential matters. Diogenes was not only not superior to other men, no nearer to the [\q 209/] truth than they, by reason of his tub and of his physical. renunciation; he was their ethical inferior, and was intellectually wrong. So hard, so very hard, was the struggle  that the Arahat, or, the man striving towards Arahatship, should be always sufficiently clothed, and take regular baths, regular exercise, regular food. The line was to be drawn at another point. He was to avoid, not what was necessary to maintain himself in full bodily vigour and power, but all undue luxury, and all worry about personal comfort. It was his duty to keep himself in health.
It is open to question whether the earnest and unworldly would now draw the line at the precise point at which Gotama drew it; either as regards what they would think proper for themselves now, or what they would have thought most proper for those living in India then. Probably they would think rather that he erred on the side of austerity. His contemporaries the Nigaṇṭhas thought the other way. And the most serious schism in the Buddhist Order, that raised by Devadatta, was especially defended on the ground that Gotama would not, as regards various points, adopt ascetic practices which Devadatta held to be then necessary.
It is probable that Gotama was largely guided by the opinions and practice of previous recluses. For we have already seen that in other matters, important it is true but not essential, Gotama adopted and extended, so far as it agreed with the rest of his system, what had already been put forward by others. But we cannot, as yet, speak on this point with as much certainty as we could in the other cases of the ethical view of sacrifice, of the ethical connotation attached to the word Brahman,  and of the reasonable view as to social distinctions and questions of impurity. Our available texts are only sufficient, at present, to suggest the probability.
The technical term tapas is already found in the Rig-veda, though only in the latest hymns included in the collection. It is literally ‘glow, burning,’ and very early acquired the secondary sense of retirement into solitude, and of the attempted conquest of one’s lower nature by the burning heat of bodily austerity. And this must have been a common practice, for the time of the year most favourable to such [\q 210/] tapas came to be known as the month tapas. There was no association with the word of what we call ‘penance,’ a conception arising out of an entirely different order of religious ideas. There was no idea of atonement for, punishment of, making amends for sin. But just as the sacrificer was supposed, by a sort of charm that he worked by his sacrifice, to attain ends desirable for himself, so there was supposed to be a sort of charm in tapas producing mystic and marvellous results. The distinction seems to have been that it was rather power, worldly success, wealth, children, and heaven that were attained by sacrifice; and mystic, extraordinary, superhuman faculties that were attained by tapas.
By a natural anthropomorphism the gods too were supposed, for like ends, to offer sacrifice and to perform tapas. Thus it is sometimes by sacrifice, but more often by tapas, that in the different cosmological legends one god or the other is supposed to bring forth creation.  In the latter case an expression often used on such occasions is tapas atapasyata, literally ‘he glowed a glow,’ and the exact meaning of this enigmatic phrase is by no means certain. It may have been meant to convey that he glowed with fierce resolve, or that he glowed with deep thought, or that he glowed with strong desire, or that he carried out each or some or all of the practices given in Kassapa’s three lists of self-mortifications in our Sutta. All these various ideas may possibly be meant to be inferred together, and before they were ascribed to gods similar actions must have been well-known among men.
There were some, as one would expect, who therefore placed austerity above sacrice, or, held that it could take the place of sacrifice.  The more conservative view of the learned Brahman—that it is repeating by heart to oneself, and teaching others, the Vedic verses, that is the chief thing (with which twelve other qualities or practices should always be associated)—is only given with the interesting note that one teacher thinks ‘the true’ only, another thinks austerity only to be necessary, and yet a third thinks that learning and teaching the Veda is enough by itself, ‘for that is tapas, that is tapas’ . There are several passages making similar comparisons. Thus one text says: ‘There are three branches of duty—sacrifice study of the Veda and charity are the first, austerity (tapas) is the second, to dwell as a learner one’s life [\q 211/] long in the house of one’s teacher is the third. All these have as reward heavenly worlds. But he who stands firm in Brahman obtains deathlessness.’ 
So in the passages which explain (by no means consistently) where the soul goes to after it leaves the body, we have a somewhat corresponding division.  According to the Chāndogya, those who know a certain mystical doctrine about five fires, and those who in the forest follow faith and austerity (tapas), go along the path of the gods to the Brahma worlds. On the other hand, they who sacrifice, and give alms go to the moon, and thence return to earth, and are reborn in high or low positions according to their deeds. But the bad become insects.
According to the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, those who know the mystic doctrine of the five fires, and those who in the woods practise faith and truth (not tapas) go to the Brahma worlds. On the other hand, those who practise sacrifice, charity, and austerity (tapas) go to the moon, and are thence reborn on earth. But those who follow neither of these two paths become insects.
Here austerity is put into a lower grade than it occupies in the last extract. Other later passages are Muṇḍaka II, 7; III, 2, 4, 6; Praṣna I, 9; V, 4. Though the details differ there is a general concensus that above both sacrifice and austerity, which are themselves meritorious, there is a something higher, a certain kind of truth or faith or wisdom.
This is the exact analogue, from the Upanishad point of view, to the doctrine of the Buddhists that Arahatship is better than austerity. And though the Upanishad belief is not worked out with the same consistency, nor carried so far to its logical conclusion, as the Buddhist, that is simply to be explained by the facts that it is not only earlier, belonging to a time when thought was less matured, but is also not the work of one mind, but of several. There can be but little doubt that Gotama, during his years of study and austerity before he attained Nirvāṇa under the Tree of Wisdom, had come into contact with the very beliefs, or at least with beliefs similar to those, now preserved in the Upanishads; and that his general conclusion was based upon them. That he practically condemns physical tapas (austerity) altogether is no argument against his indebtedness, so far as the superiority of wisdom to austerity is concerned, to the older theory.
In the passages in which that older theory is set forth we [\q 212/] have the germs—indistinct statements, no doubt, and inconsistent, but still the first source—of the well-known theory of the Āṣramas; the Efforts (or perhaps Trainings), four stages into which the life of each member of the ranks of the twice-born (the Dvijas) should be divided. In later times these are (1) the student, (2) the householder,. (3) the hermit, and (4) the wandering ascetic; that is, the Brahmacārin, the G"ihastha, the Vānaprastha, and the Yati.  And stress was laid on the order in which the stages of effort were taken up, it being held improper for a man to enter the latter without having passed through the former.
The Upanishad passages know nothing of the curious technical term of Effort (Āsrama) applied to these stages. And they have really only two divisions (and these not regarded as consecutive stages), that of the sacrificer and of the hermit (not the Bhikshu). Of course studentship is understood as preliminary to both. But we are here at a standpoint really quite apart from the Āsrama theory, and Saṅkara and other commentators are obliged to resort to curious and irreconcilable shifts when they try to read back into these old texts the later and more developed doctrine. 
Even the names of the several Āsramas do not occur, as such, in the older Upanishads. Brahmacārin is frequently used for pupil, Yati in two or three passages means ascetic; but G"ihastha, Vānaprastha, and Bhikshu do not even occur.  The earliest mention of the Four Efforts is in the old law books. Gautama (III, 2) gives them as Brahmacārin, G"ihastha, Bhikshu, and Vaikhānasa (student, householder, wandering beggar, and hermit). Āpastamba (II, 9, 21, 1) has a different order, and different names for the four stages—Gārhasthyaṃ, Ācāryakulaṃ, Maunaṃ, and Vānaprasthyaṃ. 
Hofrath Bhler dated these works (very hypothetically) in the fifth and third, or possibly in the sixth and fourth centuries B. C.  The theory of the Four Efforts was then [\q 213/] already current, but by no means settled as to detail. It must evidently have taken shape between the date of the Upanishads just quoted and that of the law books; that is to say, either just before or, some time after the rise of Buddhism. We can, I, think, go safely further, and say that it must have been, in all probability, after Buddha, and even after the time when the Piṭakas were put together. For neither the technical term Āsrama, nor any of the four stages of it, are mentioned in the Piṭakas.
The theory has become finally formulated, in the order as to detail which has permanently survived, in the later law books from Vasishṭha onwards. He gives the Four Efforts or stages in the life of an orthodox person, as (1) Student, (2) Householder, (3) Hermit, (4) Wandering Mendicant—Brahmacārin, Gṛihastha, Vānaprastha, and Parivrājaka. 
It will be noticed that this final arrangement differs in two respects—and both of them of importance—from the earliest. In the first place the wandering beggar is put in the last, that is in the highest, place. He is not subordinated, as he was at first, to the hermit. In the second place the expression Bhikshu, applied in Gautama to the wandering mendicant, is dropped in the later books.
The commentators are at great pains to harmonise the divergent order. And they do so by suggesting that the earlier arrangement (which, of course, is, in their eyes, the strange one) is meant to infer exactly the same as does the contrary later arrangement so familiar to them. To them the wandering mendicant had become the last, in order of time and importance, of the Four Efforts; and they try to put back their own view into the words of the ancient writer they are dealing with. But if the order they were familiar with implies one thing, the older order, which is exactly the reverse, can scarcely imply the same. Or if it does, then the question arises, why should it? In either case the explanation may be sought for in the history of the two ideas.
Now the distinction between the two is quite clear, though the ambiguity of the English word ‘ascetic,’ often applied to both, may tend to hide it from View.  Gautama starts his [\q 214/] description of the hermit by saying that he is to feed on roots and fruits, and practise tapas. And all the later books lay stress on the same point; often giving, as instances of the tapas, one or other of the very practices detailed by Kassapa the tāpasa, in his three lists, in our Sutta.  On the other hand, the wandering mendicant does not practise these severe physical self-mortifications. He is never called tāpasa, and though he has abandoned the world, and wanders without a home, simply clad, and begging his food, his self-restraint is mental rather than physical. Of the fifteen rules laid down for him by Gautama, who calls him the Bhikshu (in X, 11-25), four or five are precisely equivalent to rules the Buddhist Bhikshu has to observe. There is one significant rule in Baudhāyana, however, which is quite contrary to the corresponding Buddhist rule. According to it the twice-born mendicant of the priestly books is, in begging for food, to observe the rules of ceremonial purity, what we call now the rules of caste. 
Now while the belief in the special efficacy and holiness of austerity, self-torture, tapas; is a world-wide phenomenon, and the practice of it was, no doubt, very early in India too, the idea of the wandering mendicant is peculiar to India. And though the origin and early history of this institution are at present obscure, we have no reason to believe that it was of ancient date.
It was older than the Buddha’s time. Both Buddhist and Jain records agree on this point. And they are confirmed by an isolated passage in an Upanishad which, as a whole, is pre-Buddhistic.  There it is said that he who desires to see [\q 215/] the god Brahman cannot attain his end by speculation; he must put away learning and become childlike, put away childishness and become a muni (a silent one),  put away silence and become a Brāhmaṇa (that is, of course, not a Brahmaṇa by birth, but one in a sense nearly the same as Gotama attaches to the word in the Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta). This is to explain why it is that ‘Brāhmaṇas’ (in the ethical sense) give up cravings for children and wealth and the world and adopt begging as a regular habit (bhikshācaryaṃ caranti). Another recession of the same passage, also preserved in the same Upanishad  , but in a connection which Deussen thinks is a later interpolation,  ascribes this habit to ‘men of old.’ The statement is no doubt ambiguous. It might be taken to apply to the hermit (the tāpasa) who also begged. But I think on the whole that the wandering mendicant is more probably referred to, and referred to as belonging to a higher sphere than the muni, the ascetic. If that be so, this is the earliest passage in which any one of these three ideas (the wandering mendicant, his superiority to the ascetic, and the special ethical sense of the word Brāhmaṇa ) have, as yet, been found.
The oldest reference in the priestly literature to unorthodox Bhikshus (not necessarily Buddhists) is probably the Maitri Upanishad VIII, 8, which is much later. There is a custom, often referred to in the law books, of students begging their food. This was doubtless of long standing. But it is a conception altogether different from that of the wandering mendicant. The word Bhikshu does not occur in any of these passages. And indeed of all the Upanishads indexed in Colonel Jacob’s ‘Concordance’ the word only occurs in one—in the little tract called the Parama-haṃsa Upanishad.
Whenever it may have arisen, the peculiar institution of the Bhikshu is quite as likely, if not more likely, to have originated in Kshatriya circles than among the learned Brahmans. All our authorities—Brahman Upanishads, Buddhist Piṭakas, Jain Aṅgas—agree in ascribing to Kshatriyas a most important, not to say predominant, part in such religious activity as lay apart from sacrifice. To take for granted that [\q 216/] the Brahmans must have originated the idea, or the practice, is to ignore all these authorities. And it is only in the Kshatriya books—those of the Buddhists and Jains—that the details of the practice receive much weight, or are dealt with in full detail.
The oldest law book has barely a page on the rules for Bhikshus, whereas the regulations, of about the same age, preserved in the Buddhist texts, fill the three volumes translated, under the title ‘Vinaya Texts,’ in the ‘sacred Books of the East.’ And as time goes on the priestly literature continues to treat the life of a Bhikshu as entirely subordinate, and in the curtest manner. Even Manu has only three or four pages on the subject. The inconsistency, brevity, and incompleteness of the regulations in the priestly books lead one to suppose that, at the time when they were written, there were not enough Bhikshus, belonging to those circles, to make the regulations intended for them alone a matter of much practical importance. In other words, the development also of the Bhikshu idea was due rather to the Kshatriyas than to the sacrificing priests.
The latter were naturally half-hearted in the matter. Even after they had invented the Āsrama theory, they did not seem to be very keen about it. On the contrary, there are several passages the other way. Āpastamba closes his exposition of them with a remark that upsets the whole theory: ‘There is no reason to place one Āsrama before another.’  And just before that he quotes a saying of Prajāpati from which it follows that those who become Bhikshus do not gain salvation at all, ‘they become dust and perish.’
This was no doubt the real inmost opinion of the more narrow-minded of the priests. But the first maker of the phrase did not quite like to put this forward in his own name—the idea of the Bhikshu as a man worthy of special esteem had already become too strong for that. So he makes the god his stalking-horse; and tries, by using his name, to gain respectability and acceptance for his view. And it survives accordingly as late as the earlier portion of Manu (II, 230), where mention is made of ‘the Three Āsramas,’ omitting the Bhikshu. We ought not to be surprised to find that, though the whole passage is reproduced, in other respects, in the Institutes of Vishṇu (XXXI, 7), this very curious and interesting phrase is replaced by another which avoids the difficulty.
[\q 217/] Baudhāyana also actually quotes with approval another old saying: ‘There was forsooth an Asura, Kapila by name, the son of Prahlāda. Striving against the gods he made these divisions (the Āṣramas). A wise man should not take heed of them. 
If the priests, when the custom of ‘going forth’ as a Bhikshu was becoming prevalent, had wished to counteract it, to put obstacles in the way, and especially to prevent any one doing so without first having become thoroughly saturated with the priestly view of things, they could scarcely have taken a more efficacious step than the establishment of this theory. And so far as it served this purpose, and so far only, do they seem to have cared much for it. We have no evidence that the theory had, at any time, become a practical reality—that is, that any considerable number of the twice-born, or even of the Brahmans, did actually carry out all the four Āṣramas. Among the circles led by the opinion of learned and orthodox priests it was, no doubt, really held improper for any man to become a religieux until he was getting old, or without having first gone through a regular course of Vedic study. And whenever he did renounce the world he was expected to follow such of the ancient customs (now preserved in the priestly books under the three heads of Vānaprastha, Parivrājaka, and Vedasaṃnyāsin) as he chose to follow. But even then he need not observe a clear distinction between these various heads. The percentage of elderly Brahmans who followed any of the three at all must always have been very small indeed, and of these a good many probably became Veda-saṃnyāsins, a group which lies outside of the Āṣramas. The rules are admitted to be obsolete now. Saṅkara says. they were not observed in his time.  And the theory seems to be little more than a priestly protest against the doctrine, acted upon by Buddhists, Jains, and others, and laid down in the Madhura Sutta, that even youths might ‘go forth’ without any previous Vedic stud y. 
There were, in other words, in the Indian community of that time, a number of people—very small, no doubt, compared with the total population, but still amounting to some thousands—who estimated the mystic power of t a p a s above that of sacrifice; who gave up the latter, and devoted themselves, in the woods, to those kinds of bodily austerity and [\q 218/] self-torture of which our Sutta gives the earliest detailed account. There were others who rejected both, and preferred the life of the wandering mendicant. In both classes there were unworthy men who used their religious professions for the ‘low aims’ set out in the tract on the Sīlas incorporated in our Sutta, whose very words, in not a few instances, recur in the old law books.
But there was also no little earnestness, no little ‘plain living and high thinking’ among these ‘irregular friars.’ And there was a great deal of sympathy, both with their aims and with their practice (provided always they keep to the priestly view of things), among the official class, the regular sacrificing priests. Instead of condemning them, the priests tried, therefore, rather to regulate them. One. Vikhanas compiled a special book on Tapas, called either after the author the Vaikhānasa Sūtra, or after the subject the Srāmaṇaka Sūtra, which is several times referred to as an authority in the law books whose precepts are doubtless, in part, taken from it.  Tapas was then, in accordance with the general view in the circles in which the law books were composed, regarded as the higher, of the two, and put therefore at the end in the list of Āṣramas.
But there was also another view which had already made itself felt in the Upanishads, which is the basis of our Sutta, and which no doubt became more widely spread in consequence of its having been the view taken up by the progressive party we now call Buddhists. According to this view the life of the Bhikshu, of the wandering mendicant, was the higher. This view, disliked by the more narrowminded, but regarded with favour by the more spirituallyminded of the Brahmans, gradually attained so unquestionably the upper hand, that the order of the last two of the Āṣramas had to be changed. T a p a s became then a preliminary stage to, instead of the final crown of, the religious life.
But the other view continued to be held by a large and influential minority. The strong leaning of the human heart to impute a singular efficacy to physical self-mortifications [\q 219/] ooooooof all kinds could not be eradicated. Many of the laity still looked on those who carried out such practices with peculiar favour. The tendency made itself felt even in Buddhism, in spite of our present Sutta, and of many other passages to a similar effect. There is a special name for the ‘extra vows,’ the dhutangas, carried out by such of the brethren as were inclined that way. And these receive special glorification in a whole book at the end of the Milinda.  It is true that, even in these ‘extra vows,’ all the extreme forms of tapas are omitted. But this is only a matter of degree. In the priestly law books, also, though they go somewhat further than the dhutangas, the most extreme forms are omitted, especially in the rules for hermits and mendicants contained in the earlier books. This is another point in which the early Buddhists and the more advanced of the learned Brahmans of their time are found to be acting in sympathy. But the discussion of the details would take us too far from our subject.
The Nigaṇṭhas, Ājīvakas, and others went to the other extreme, and like the Buddhists, they never admitted any theory like that of the distinction in time between the Four Āṣramas.  It is even doubtful how far that distinction became a really valid and practical reality among the learned priests. They alone, as we have seen, always laid stress on the importance of not ‘going forth,’ either as ascetic or as wandering mendicant (tāpasa or bhikshu unless first the years of studentship, and then the life as a sacrificing householder, had been fulfilled. They spoke occasionally of Three Efforts only. And as we have seen the lawyers differed in the order in which they mention the two classes of religieux. 
[\q 220/] By the time that the later order was settled the word Bhikshu had come to mean so specially a Buddhist mendicant that the learned Brahmans no longer thought it fitting to apply the term to their own mendicants. This at least may be to the explanation of the fact that it is used in Gautama’s law book, and not afterwards.
The history of the word is somewhat doubtful. It is not found as yet, as we have seen above, in any pre-Buddhistic text. Perhaps the Jains or the Buddhists first used it. But it was more probably a term common before their time, though not long before, to all mendicants. The form is sufficiently curious for Pāṇini to take special notice of it in the rule for the formation from desideratives of nouns in u.  In another rule  he mentions two Bhikshu Sūtras—manuals for mendicants, as the Vaikhānasa Sūtra was for the hermits (tāpasas). These are used by the Pārāṣāriṇas and the Karmandinas, two groups or corporations, doubtless, of Brahmanical mendicants. Professor Weber refers to this in his History of Indian Literature, P. 305, and Professor Kielhorn has been kind enough to inform me that nothing more has been since discovered on the matter. These Sūtras are not mentioned elsewhere. And they can never have acquired so much importance as the Vaikhānasa Sūtra, or they would almost certainly have been referred to in the sections in the later law books on mendicants, just as the Vaikhānasa is in the sections on the tāpasas.
It is also very curious to find Brāhmaṇa Bhikshus with special class names as if they belonged to an Order like those of the Buddhists and the Jains. No such Brahmanical Orders of recluses (pabbajitā) are mentioned in the Piṭakas. When Brāhmaṇa Bhikshus are referred to, it is either as isolated recluses, or by a generic name not implying any separate Order. Thus in an important passage of the Aṅguttara we have the following list of religieux, contemporaries of the Buddha:
No. I. The men of the livelihood, among whom Makkhali Gosāla was a recognised leader, were especially addicted to [\q 221/] tapas of all kinds, and went always quite naked. The name probably means: ‘Those who claimed to be especially strict in their rules as to means of livelihood.’ The Buddhists also laid special stress on this. The fifth of the eight divisions of the Eightfold Path is sammā ājīvo. 
No. 2. The Unfettered are the sect we now call Jains, then under the leadership of the Nātaputta. They were also addicted, but to a somewhat less degree, to tapas; and Buddhaghosa here adds that they wore a loin cloth.
No. 3. The disciples of the Shaveling are stated by Buddhaghosa to be the same as No. 2. The reading is doubtful, and his explanation requires explanation. Perhaps some special subdivision of the Jains is intended.
No. 4. Those who wear their hair in braids. To do so was the rule for the orthodox hermits (the Vānaprasthas or Tāpasas, Gautama III, 34). The Brāhmaṇa Bhikshu, on the other hand, was either to be bald, or to have only a forelock (ibid. 22).
No. 5. The Wanderers. This is a generic term for wandering mendicants. They went, according to Buddhaghosa, fully clad.
Nos. 6-10 are said by Buddhaghosa to be followers of the Titthiyā, that is the leaders of all schools that were non-Buddhist. It is precisely here that the list becomes most interesting, the first five names being otherwise known. And it is much to be regretted that the tradition had not preserved any better explanation of the terms than the vague phrase repeated by Buddhaghosa.
No. 6. is quite unintelligible at present.
No. 7. The Bearers of the triple staff have not been found elsewhere, as yet, earlier than the latest part of Manu (XII, 10),. It is very possibly the name given in the Buddhist community to the Brāhmaṇa Bhikshus (not Tāpasas). They carried three staves bound up as one, as a sign, it is supposed, of their self-restraint in thought, word, and deed. This explanation may possibly hold good for so early a date. But it may also be nothing more than an edifying gloss on an old word whose original meaning had been forgotten. In that case the gloss would be founded on such passages as Gaut. III, 17,  where the idea of this threefold division of conduct recurs in the law books. But the technical term tridaṇḍin is not mentioned in them.
[\q 222/] No. 8. The not opposing ones, the Friends, are not mentioned elsewhere.
No. 9. The followers of Gotama means, almost certainly, the followers of some other member of the Sākya clan, distinct from our Gotama. who also founded an Order. We only know of one who did so, Devadatta. The only alternative is that some Brāhmaṇa, belonging to the Gotama gotra, is here referred to as having had a community of Bhikshus named after him. But we know nothing of any such person.
No. 10. Those who follow the religion of the God are not mentioned elsewhere. Who is ‘the God’? Is it Sakka (Indra) or Siva? The Deva of the names Devadatta, Devaseṭṭhi, Devadaha, &c., is probably the same.
We find in this suggestive list several names, used technically as the designation of particular sects, but in meaning applicable quite as much to most of the others. They all claimed to be pure as regards means of livelihood, to be unfettered, to be friends; they all wandered from place to place, they were all mendicants. And the names can only gradually have come to have the special meaning of the member of one school, or order, only. We should not, therefore, be surprised if the name Bhikshu,. also, has had a similar history. 
VIII. KASSAPA-SĪHANĀDA SUTTA.
[THE NAKED ASCETIC.]
 1. Thus have I heard. The Blessed One was once dwelling at Ujuññā, in the Kaṇṇakatthala deerpark.  Now Kassapa, a naked ascetic, came to where the Exalted One was, and exchanged with him the greetings and compliments of civility and courtesy, and stood respectfully aside. And, so standing, he said to the Exalted One:
2. ‘I have heard it said, O Gotama, thus: “The Samaṇa Gotama disparages all penance; verily he reviles and finds fault with every ascetic, with every one who lives a hard life.” Now those, O Gotama, who said this, were they therein repeating Gotama’s words, and not reporting him falsely? Are they announcing, as a minor tenet of his, a matter really following from his Dhamma (his system)? Is there nothing in this opinion of his, so put forward as wrapt up with his system, or as a corollary from it, that could meet with objection?  For we would fain bring no false accusation against the venerable Gotama.’
3. ‘No, Kassapa. Those who said so were not [\q 224/] following my words. On the contrary, they were reporting me falsely, and at variance with the fact.
 ‘Herein, O Kassapa, I am wont to be aware, with vision bright and purified, seeing beyond what men can see, how some men given to asceticism, living a hard life, are reborn, on the dissolution of the body, after death, into some unhappy, fallen state of misery and woe; while others, living just so, are reborn into some happy state, or into a heavenly world—how some men given to asceticism, but living a life less hard, are equally reborn, on the dissolution of the body, after death into some unhappy, fallen state of misery and woe; while others, living just so, are reborn in some happy state, or into a heavenly world. How then could I, O Kassapa, who am thus aware, as they really are, of the states whence men have come, and whither they will go, as they pass away from one form of existence, and take shape in another—how could I disparage all penance; or bluntly revile and find fault with every ascetic, with every one who lives a life that is hard?
4. ‘Now there are, O Kassapa, certain recluses and Brahmans who are clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair splitters, who go about, one would think, breaking into pieces by their wisdom the speculations of their adversaries. And as between them and me there is, as to some points, agreement, and as to some points, not. As to some of those things they approve, we also approve thereof. As to some of those things they disapprove, we also disapprove thereof. As to some of the things they approve, we disapprove thereof. As to some of the things they disapprove, we approve thereof. And some things we approve of, so do they. And some things we disapprove of, so do they.  And some things we approve, they do not. And some things we disapprove of, they approve thereof
5. ‘And I went to them, and said: “As for those things, my friends, on which we do not agree, let us leave them alone. As to those things on which we [\q 225/] agree, let the wise put questions about them, ask for reasons as to them, talk them over, with or to their teacher, with or to their fellow disciples, saying: ‘Those conditions of heart, Sirs, which are evil or accounted as evil among you which are blameworthy or accounted as such among you, which are insufficient for the attainment of Arahatship, or accounted as such among you, depraved or accounted as such among you—who is it who conducts himself as one who has more absolutely put them away from him, the Samaṇa Gotama, or, the other venerable ones, the teachers of schools? ’ ”
6. ‘Then it may well be, O Kassapa, that the wise, so putting questions one to the other, asking for reasons, talking the matter over, should say: “The Samaṇa Gotama conducts himself as one who has absolutely put those conditions away from him; whereas the venerable ones, the other teachers of schools, have done so only partially.” Thus is it, O Kassapa, that the wise, so putting questions one to the other, asking for reasons, talking the matter over, would, for the most part, speak in praise of us therein.
7. ‘And again, O Kassapa, let the wise put questions one to another, ask for reasons, talk the matter over, with or to their teacher, with or to their fellow disciples, saying: “Those conditions of heart, Sirs, which are good or accounted as such among you, which are blameless or accounted as such among you, which suffice to lead a man to Arahatship or are accounted as sufficient among you, which are pure or accounted as such among you—who is it who conducts himself as one who has more completely taken them upon him, the Samaṇa Gotama, or the other venerable ones, the teachers of schools? ”
8. ‘Then it may well be, O Kassapa, that the wise, so putting questions one to the other, asking for reasons, talking the matter over, should say: “The Samaṇa Gotama conducts himself as one who has completely taken these conditions upon him, whereas the venerable [\q 226/] ones, the other teachers of schools, have done so only partially.” Thus it is, O Kassapa, that the wise, so putting questions one to the other, asking for reasons, talking the matter over, would, for the most part, speak in praise of us therein.
 9-12. ‘ [And further, also, O Kassapa, the wise would, for the most part, acknowledge that the body of my disciples were more addicted to that which is generally acknowledged to be good, refrain themselves more completely from that which is generally acknowledged to be evil, than the venerable ones, the disciples of other teachers.] 
 13. ‘Now there is, O Kassapa, a way, there is a method which if a man follow he will of himself, both see and know that: “The Samaṇa Gotama is one who speaks in due season, speaks that which is, that which redounds to advantage, that which is the Norm (the Dhamma), that which is the law of self-restraint (the Vinaya).”
‘And what, Kassapa, is that way, what that method, which if a man follow, he will, of himself, know that, and see that. Verily it is this Noble Eightfold Path, that is to say: Right Views, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Mode of Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Rapture.
‘This, Kassapa, is that way, this that method, which if a man follow, he will of himself, both know and see that: “The Samaṇa Gotama is one who speaks in due season, speaks that which is, that which redounds to profit, that which is the Norm, that which is the law of self-restraint.”
14. And when he had spoken thus, Kassapa, the naked ascetic, said to the Exalted One:
And so also, Gotama, are the following ascetic practices accounted, in the opinion of some Samaṇas [\q 227/] and Brāhmaṇas, as Samaṇaship and Brāhmaṇaship. 
 ‘“‘He goes naked:
‘He is of loose habits (performing his bodily functions, and eating food, in a standing posture, not crouching down or sitting down, as well-bred people do):“He licks his hands clean (after eating, instead of washing them, as others do) :
‘‘(When on his rounds for alms, if politely requested to step nearer, or to wait a moment, in order that food may be put into his bowl), he passes stolidly on (lest he should incur the guilt of following another person’s word)
‘He refuses to accept food brought (to him, before he has started on his daily round for alms):
‘‘He refuses to accept (food, if told that it has been prepared) especially for him:
‘‘He refuses to accept any invitation (to call on his rounds at any particular house, or to pass along any particular street, or to go to any particular place):
‘‘He will not accept (food taken direct) from the mouth of the pot or pans  (in which it is cooked; lest [ [\q 228/] those vessels should be struck or scraped, on his account, with the spoon):
‘ “(He will) not (accept food placed) within the threshold (lest it should have been placed there specially for him):
‘ “(He will) not (accept food placed) among the sticks  (lest it should have been placed there specially for him):
‘“(He will) not (accept food placed) among the pestles (lest it should have been placed there specially for him):
‘“When two persons are eating together he will not accept (food, taken from what they are eating, if offered to him by only one of the two):
‘‘He will not accept food from a woman with child (lest the child should suffer want):
‘‘He will not accept food from a woman giving suck (lest the milk should grow less): ‘He will not accept food from a woman in intercourse with a man  (lest their intercourse be hindered):
[\q 229/] ‘‘He will not accept food collected (by the faithful in time of drought) :
‘‘He will not accept. food where a dog is standing by (lest the dog should lose a meal):
‘‘He will not accept food where flies are swarming round (lest the flies should suffer)
‘ He will not accept fish, nor meat, nor strong drink, nor intoxicants, nor gruel 
‘He is a “One-houser” (turning back from his round as soon as he has received an alms at any one house), a “One-mouthful-man ":
‘‘Or he is a “Two-houser,” a “Two-mouthful-man ":
‘‘Or he is a “Seven-houser,” a “Seven-mouthful-man
‘He keeps himself going on only one alms,  or only two, or so on up to only seven:
‘‘He takes food only once a day, or once every two days, or so on up to once every seven days. Thus does he dwell addicted to the practice of taking food according to rule, at regular intervals, up to even half a month.
‘And so also, Gotama, are the following ascetic practices accounted, in the opinion of some Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, as Samaṇaship and Brāhmaṇaship:
[\q 230/] ‘‘He feeds on potherbs, on wild rice,  on Nivāra seeds, on leather parings,  on the water-plant called Haṭa, on the fine powder which adheres to the grains of rice beneath the husk, on the discarded scum of boiling rice, on the flour of oil-seeds,  on grasses, on cow-dung, on fruits and roots from the woods, on fruits that have fallen of themselves.
‘And so also, Gotama, are the following ascetic practices accounted, in the opinion of some Samaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, as Samaṇaship and Brāhmaṇaship:
‘‘He wears coarse hempen cloth:
‘‘He wears coarse cloth of interwoven hemp and other materials:
‘‘He wears cloths taken from corpses and thrown away :
‘‘He wears clothing made of rags picked up from a dust heap:
‘‘He wears clothing made of the bark of the Tirītaka tree :
‘  ‘He wears the natural hide of a black antelope:
‘‘He wears a dress made of a network of strips of a black antelope’s hide :
‘‘He wears a dress made of Kusa grass fibre:
‘‘He wears a garment of bark:
[\q 231/] ‘‘‘He wears a garment made of small slips or slabs of wood (shingle) pieced together 
’He wears, as a garment, a blanket of human hair :
‘’He wears, as a garment, a blanket made of horses’ tails :
‘’He wears, as a garment, a blanket made of the feathers of owls:
‘’He is a "plucker-out-of-hair-and-beard,” addicted to the practice of plucking out both hair and beard:
‘’He is a “stander-up,” rejecting the use of a seat:
‘‘He is a “croucher-down-on-the-heels,” addicted to exerting himself when crouching down on his heels. 
’He is a “bed-of-thorns-man,” putting iron spikes or natural thorns under the skin on which he sleeps :
‘‘He uses a plank bed:
‘‘He sleeps on the bare ground :
‘‘‘He sleeps always on one side:
‘‘He is a "dust-and-dirt-wearer,” (smearing his body with oil he stands where dust clouds blow, and lets the dust adhere to his body):
‘‘He lives and sleeps in the open air :
‘‘Whatsoever seat is offered to him, that he accepts [\q 232/] (without being offended at its being not dignified enough):
‘‘He is a “filth-eater,” addicted to the practice of feeding on the four kinds of filth (cow-dung, cow’s urine, ashes, and clay) :
‘‘He is a “non-drinker,” addicted to the practice of never drinking cold water (lest he should injure the souls in it) :
‘He is an “evening-third-man,” addicted to the practice of going down into water thrice a day (to wash away his sins).
15. ‘If a man, O Kassapa, should go naked, and be of loose habits, and lick his hands clean with his tongue, and do and be all those other things you gave in detail, down to his being addicted to the practice of taking food, according to rule, at regular intervals up to even half a month—if he does all this, and the state of blissful attainment in conduct, in heart, in intellect, have not been practised by him, realised by him, then is he far from Samaṇaship, far from Brāhmaṇaship. But from the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no ill will—from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this visible world, has come to realise and know—from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa !
[\q 233/] ‘And if a man, O Kassapa, feed on potherbs, on wild rice, on Nivāra seeds, or on any of those other things you gave in detail down to fruits that have fallen of themselves, and the state of blissful attainment in conduct, in heart, in intellect, have not been practised by him, realised by him, then is he far from Samaṇaship, far from Brāhmaṇaship. But from the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no ill will—from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet. in this visible world, has come to realise and know—from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa!
 ‘And if a man, O Kassapa, wear coarse hempen cloth,, or carry out all or any of those other practices you gave in detail down to bathing in water three times a day, and the state of blissful attainment in conduct, in heart, in intellect, have not been practised by him, realised by him, then is he far from Samaṇaship, far from Brāhmaṇaship. But from the time, O Kassapa when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no ill will—from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this visible world, has come to realise and know—from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa!’
[\q 234/]  16. And when he had thus spoken, Kassapa, the naked ascetic, said to the Blessed One: ‘How hard then, Gotama, must Samaṇaship be to gain, how hard must Brāhmaṇaship be!’
‘That, Kassapa, is a common saying in the world that the life of a Samaṇa and of a Brāhmaṇa is hard to lead. But if the hardness, the very great hardness, of that life depended merely on this ascetism, on the carrying out of any or all of those practices you have detailed, then it would not be fitting to say that the life of the Samaṇa, of the Brāhmaṇa, was hard to lead. It would be quite possible for a householder, or for the son of a householder, or for any one, down to the slave girl who carries the water-jar, to say: “Let me now go naked, let me become of low habits,” and so on through all the items of those three lists of yours. But since, Kassapa, quite apart from these matters, quite apart from all kinds of penance, the life is hard, very hard to lead; therefore is it that it is fitting to say: “How hard must Samaṇaship be to gain, how hard must Brāhmaṇaship be! “For from the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no ill will—from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, in that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this visible world, has come to realise and know—from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa  !
 17. And when he had thus spoken, Kassapa, the naked ascetic, said to the Blessed One: ‘ Hard is it, Gotama, to know when a man is a Samaṇa, hard to know when a man is a Brāhmaṇa!’
‘That, Kassapa, is a common saying in the world [\q 235/] that it is hard to know a Samaṇa, hard to know a Brāhmaṇa. But if being a Samaṇa, if being a Brāhmaṇa, depended merely on this asceticism, on the carrying out of any or each of those practices you have detailed, then it would not be fitting to say that a Samaṇa is hard to recognise, a Brāhmaṇa is hard to recognise. It would be quite possible for a householder, or for the son of a householder, or for any one down to the slave girl who carries the water-jar, to know: “This man goes naked, or is of loose habits, or licks his fingers with his tongue,” and so on through all the items of those three lists of yours. But since, Kassapa, quite apart from these matters, quite apart from all kinds of penance, it is hard to recognise a Samaṇa, hard to recognise a Brāhmaṇa, therefore is it fitting to say: “Hard is it to know when a man is a Samaṇa, to know when a man is a Brāhmaṇa!” For from the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no ill will—from the time when, by the destruction of the deadly intoxications (the lusts of the flesh, the lust after future life, and the defilements of delusion and ignorance), he dwells in that emancipation of heart, in that emancipation of mind, that is free from those intoxications, and that he, while yet in this visible world, has come to realise and know-from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the Bhikkhu is called a Samaṇa, is called a Brāhmaṇa !’
 18. And when he had thus spoken, Kassapa, the naked ascetic,. said to the Blessed One: ‘What then, Gotama, is that blissful attainment in conduct, in heart, and in mind
[The answer [171-173] is all the paragraphs in the Sāmañña-phala translated above, and here divided as follows:
Under Conduct (Sīla).
1. The paragraphs on the appearance of a Buddha, the conversion of a layman, his entry into the Order ( Sections 40-42 above, pp. 78-79).
[\q 236/] 2. The Sīlas, as in the Brahma-jāla, Sections 8-27. See above, pp. 57, 58.
3. The paragraph on Confidence ( Section 63 above, p. 79).
Under the heart (Citta).
4. The paragraph on ‘Guarded is the door of his senses’ ( Section 64 above, pp. 79, 80).
5. The paragraph on ‘Mindful and Selfpossessed’ ( Section 65 above, pp. 80, 81).
6. The paragraph on Simplicity of Life, being content with little ( Section 66 above, p. 81).
7. The paragraphs on Emancipation from the Five Hindrances—covetousness, ill-temper, laziness, worry, and perplexity ( Section 67-74 above, pp. 82-84)
8. The paragraph on the joy and Peace, that, as a result of this emancipation, fills his whole being ( Section 75 above, p. 84).
9. The paragraphs on the Four Ecstasies (jhānas, Sections 75-82 above, pp. 84-86).
Under Intelligence (Paññā).
10. The paragraphs on the Insight arising from Knowledge (Ñāṇa-dassana, 83,84 above, pp. 86, 87.)
11. The paragraphs on the power of projecting mental images (Sections 85, 86 above, p. 87).
12. The paragraphs on the five modes of special intuition (abhiññā):
a. The practice of iddhi.
b. Hearing heavenly sounds.
c. Knowledge of other people’s thoughts.
d. Knowledge of one’s own previous births.
e. Knowledge of other people’s previous births.
13. The realisation of the Four Noble Truths, the destruction of the Intoxications, and the attainment of Arahatship.]
‘“And there is no other state of blissful attainment [\q 237/] in conduct and heart and mind which is, Kassapa, higher and sweeter than this. 
 21. ‘Now there are some recluses and Brahmans, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on conduct. They speak, in various ways, in praise of morality. But so far as regards the really noble, the highest conduct, I am aware of no one who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the highest conduct (of the Path).
‘There are some recluses and Brahmans, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on self-mortification, and scrupulous care of others. They speak in various ways in praise of self-torture and of austere scrupulousness. But so far as regards the really noblest, the highest sort of self-mortification and scrupulous regard for others, I am aware of no one else who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the highest sort of scrupulous regard for others. 
‘There are some recluses and Brahmans, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on intelligence. They speak, in various ways, in praise of intelligence. But so far as regards the really noblest, the highest intelligence, I am aware of no one else who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the highest Wisdom  (of the Path).
[\q 238/] ‘There are some recluses and Brahmans, Kassapa, who lay emphasis on emancipation. They speak, in various ways, in praise of emancipation. But so far as regards the really noblest, the highest emancipation, I am aware of no one else who is equal to myself, much less superior. And it is I who have gone the furthest therein; that is, in the most complete emancipation (of the Path).
 22. ‘Now it may well be, Kassapa, that the recluses of adverse schools may say: “The Samaṇa Gotama utters forth a lion’s roar; but it is in solitude that he roars, not where men are assembled.” Then should they be answered: “Say not so. The Samaṇa Gotama utters his lion’s roar, and that too in the assemblies where men congregate.”
‘And it may well be, Kassapa, that the recluses of adverse schools should thus, in succession, raise each of the following objections
” But it is not in full confidence that he roars:
‘” But men put no questions to him:
‘” But even when questioned, he cannot answer:” But even when he answers. he gives no satisfaction by his exposition of the problem put:
‘"But men do not hold his opinion worthy to be listened to:
‘"But even when men listen to his word, they experience no conviction therefrom:
‘"But even when convinced, men give no outward sign of their faith:
‘” But even when they give such outward sign, they arrive not at the truth:
‘” But even when they arrive at the truth they cannot carry it out: “‘Then in each such case, Kassapa, they should be answered as before, until the answer runs: “Say not so. For the Samaṇa Gotama both utters forth his [\q 239/] lion’s roar, and that too in assemblies where men congregate, and in full confidence in the justice of his claim, and men put their questions to him on that, and on being questioned he expounds the problem put, and by his exposition thereof satisfaction arises in their hearts, and they hold it worthy to listen to his word, and in listening to it they experience conviction, and being convinced they give outward signs thereof, and they penetrate even to the truth, and having grasped it they are able also to carry the truth out!
23.‘I was staying once, Kassapa, at Rājagaha, on the hill called the Vulture’s Peak. And there a follower of the same mode of life as yours, by name  Nigrodha, asked me a question about the higher forms of austere scrupulousness of life. And having been thus questioned I expounded the problem put. And when I had thus answered what he asked, he was well pleased, as if with a ‘ great joy  .’
‘And who, Sir, on hearing the doctrine of the Exalted One, would not be well pleased, as if with a great joy. I also, who have now heard the doctrine of the Exalted One, am thus well pleased, even as if with a great joy. Most excellent, Lord, are the words of thy mouth, most excellent, just as if a man were to set up what has been thrown down, or were to reveal that which has been hidden away, or were to point out the right road to him who has gone astray, or were to bring a lamp into the darkness, so that those who have eyes could see external forms—just even so, Lord, has the truth been made known to me, in many a figure, by the Exalted One. And I, even I, betake myself as my guide to the Exalted One, and to the Doctrine and to the Brotherhood. I would fain, Lord, renounce the world under the Exalted One; I would fain be admitted to his Order.’
24. ‘Whosoever, Kassapa, having formerly been a member of another school, wishes to renounce the world and receive initiation in this doctrine and [\q 240/] discipline, he remains in probation for four months  And at the end of the four months the brethren, exalted in spirit, give him initiation, and receive him into the Order, raising him up into the state of a Bhikkhu. But nevertheless I recognise, in such cases, the distinction there may be between individuals.’
‘Since, Lord, the four months’ probation is the regular custom, I too, then, will remain on probation for that time. . Then let the brethren, exalted in spirit, give me initiation and raise me up into the. state of a Bhikkhu.’ 
So Kassapa, the naked ascetic, received initiation, and was admitted to membership of the Order under the Exalted One. And from immediately after his initiation the venerable Kassapa remained alone and separate, earnest, zealous, and master of himself. And e’er long he attained to that supreme goal  for the sake of which clansmen go forth from the household life into the homeless state: yea, that supreme goal did he, by himself, and while yet in this visible world, bring himself to the knowledge of, and continue to realise, and to see face to face. And he became sure that rebirth was at an end for him, that the higher life had been fulfilled, that everything that should be done had been accomplished, and that after this present life there would be no beyond!
And so the venerable Kassapa became yet another among the Arahats.
Here ends the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Suttanta. 
 ‘Buddhist Suttas’ (S. B. E.), p. 147.
 M. I, 79 = Jāt. I, 390.
 So also Kāṭhaka Upanishad II, 7-13.
 See B"ihad. III, 5, 1; 8, 10; IV, 4, 2 1-23; Chānd. IV, 1, 7.
Compare Āpastamba I, 8, 23, 6; Vas. VI, 3, 23, 2 5; XXVI, 11 = Manu III 87 = Vishṇu LV, 21; the passages quoted from the Mahābhārata by Muir, ‘Metrical Translations,’ pp. 263-4, and Deussen, ‘Vedānta-system,’ p. 155.
 Satapatha-Br. VI, 1, 1, 13, and several times in the early Upanishads.
 So Chānd. Up. III, 17, 2 and 4.
 Tait. I, 9. Compare, on the ethics, Manu VI, 92 and the Ten Pāramitās. The idea that Veda-learning is tapas is a common one.
 Chānd. Up. II, 23, 1.
 Chānd. Up. V, 10; B"ihad. VI, 2 ñ Praṣna I, 9; V, 4, 5.
 So Manu V, 137; VI, 87. Compare VIII, 390, and VI, 97
 See Max Mller’s interesting note in his translation of the Upanishads (Part I, pp. 82-84).
 See Jacob’s Concordance under the words.
 Comp. Baudhāyana II, 10, 17, 6, and Āpastamba II, 4, 9, 13.
 He ventures on a conjecture as to possible date in the case of Āpastamba only. Him he places on linguistic grounds not later than the third century B. C.; and, if the argument resting on the mention of Svetaketu hold good, then a century or two older. Burnell, whom Bhler (Baudh. p. xxx) calls ‘the first authority on the literature of the Schools of the Taittirīya Veda,’ to which Āpastamba belonged, was not convinced by the arguments leading up to the above conclusion. He only ventured, after reading them, to put Āpastamba ‘at least B. C.’.(Manu, p. xxvii). Baudhāyana was some generations older than Āpastamba (see Bhler, Āp. pp. xxi-xxii). And Gautama was older still.
 Vas. VII, 2.
 Thus Bhler uses the one term ‘ascetic’ to render a number of Sanskrit words-for saṃnyāsin at Baudh. II, 10, 17; for bhikshu at Gaut. III, 2, 11; for parivrājaka at Vās. X, 1; for yati at Manu VI, 54, 56, 69, 86; for tāpasa at Manu VI, 27; for muni at Manu VI, 11. Of these the last two refer to the hermit in the woods (the tāpasa), the others to the wandering mendicant (the bhikshu). Even for the old Brahman who remains at home under the protection of his son (the Veda-saṃnyāsin), he has ‘become an asectic’ (saṃnyased in the Sanskrit, Manu VI, 94).
This rendering can, in each case, be easily justified. Each of the Sanskrit words means one or other form, one or other degree, of what may be called asceticism. But the differences might be made clear by variety of rendering.
 Gautama has altogether ten rules for the hermit, none of which were applicable to the Buddhist Bhikshu (Gaut. III, 26-35).
 Baudhāyana II, 10, 18, 4, 5. Manu VI, 27 (of the hermit). So also Vas. X, 31, according to the commentator. But Bhler thinks otherwise; and Manu VI, 94 confirms Bhler’s view.
 Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad III, 5, 1.
 Afterwards an epithet often used, in the priestly literature of the hermit (the tāpasa), in the Buddhist books of the Arahat.
 Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad IV, 4, 22.
 ‘Sechzig Upanishads,’ p. 465
 Perhaps, on this third notion, Chānd. IV, 1, 7 is another passage of about the same date. A wise Sūdra is apparently there called a Brāhmaṇa. But the application is by no means certain.
 Āp. II, 9, 24, 15.
 Baudh. II, 6, 11, 28.
 See the passage quoted by Deussen, ‘Vedānta-system,’ p.40.
 See the full text in Chalmers’s paper in the J. R. A. S. for 1894
 See Bhler’s ‘Manu,’ XXVII, and the commentators referred to in Bhler’s notes, pp. 202 and 203. Also Vas. IX, 10; Gaut. III, 27 Baudh. II, 6, 11, I 4, I 5 (which proves the identity of the two); III, 3, 15-18. Haradatta on Āpastamba II, 9, 21, 21 (where he also says they are the same). Dr. Burnell had in his possession fragments of this work, or what, in his opinion, seemed to be so. He says it was used by followers of the Black Yajur-veda. Bhler also (Āp. p. 154, note) says the Sūtra is in existence, and procurable in Gujarāt.
 My ‘Milinda,’ II, 244 - 274.
 The Buddhists admitted a distinction in class as between tāpasas and bhikkhus. They often distinguish between the simple pabbajjā of the latter and the tāpasa-pabbajjā of the former. See for instance Jāt. III, 119 (of non-Buddhists).
 When the warrior hero of’ the Rāmāyaṇa brutally murders a peaceful hermit, it is not necessary to call in the Āsrama rules to justify the foul deed. The offence (in the view of the poet on the part of the hermit, in the view of most Westerns on the part of the hero) is simply social insolence. Would public opinion, in Kosala, have sanctioned such an act, or enjoyed such a story, in the time of the Piṭakas? The original Rāmāyaṇa probably arose, as Professor Jacobi has shown, in Kosala; but this episode (VII, 76) is not in the oldest part. The doctrine for which the poet claims the approval of the gods (and which, therefore, was not unquestioned among men, or he need not have done so) is that a Sūdra may not become a tāpasa.
 II, 3, 54.
 IV, 3, 110.
 See on this Order the passages quoted above in the note at p.71; and Leumann in the ‘Vienna Oriental Journal,’ III, 128.
 Comp. Baudhāyana XI, 6, 11, 23; Manu V, 165; IX, 29.
 There is a similar list, also full of interesting puzzles, but applicable of course to a date later by some centuries than the above, in the Milinda p.191. Worshippers of Siva are there expressly mentioned.
 Miga-dāye. That is, a place set apart for deer to roam in, in safety, a public park in which no hunting was allowed.
 It would, perhaps, be more agreeable to the context if one could render this idiomatic phrase: ‘Is there anything in this opinion of theirs as to his system, or as to this corollary they have drawn from it, which amounts to being a matter he would object to?’ But I do not see how this could be reconciled with the syntax of the Pāli sentence. And Buddhaghosa takes it as rendered above, summarising it in the words: ‘Is your opinion herein altogether free from blame?’
 The four paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are here repeated in full in the text with the change only of reading ‘the body of the disciples of the Samaṇa Gotama’ instead of the Samaṇa Gotama’ and similarly for the other teachers.
 The following description of the naked ascetic recurs in the Majjhima I, 77, 238, 342, II, 161, and in the Puggala Paññatti IV, 24. It consists of a string of enigmatic phrases which are interpreted in my translation, according to Buddhaghosa here, and the unknown commentator on the Puggala. These two are very nearly word for word the same. The differences are just such as would arise when two authors are drawing upon one uniform tradition.
It would seem from M. I, 238, if compared with I, 524, that it was the Ājīvakas (see note above on p. 71) who were more especially known for the practice of these forms of asceticism: and from M. I, 77 that it was these forms that had been followed by Gotama himself before his eyes were opened, before he attained to Nirvāṇa. (M. I, 167.)
 Hatthāpalekhano. The tradition was in doubt about this word. Both commentators give an alternative rendering: ‘He scratched himself clean with his hand after stooling.’ And the Puggala Paññatti commentator adds a very curious piece of old folklore as his reason for this explanation.
 Kaḷopi; not in Childers. It no doubt means some cooking vessel of a particular shape, but the exact signification, and the derivation of it are both unknown. It may possibly be a Kolarian or Dravidian word. Many centuries afterwards karoṭa and karoṭi were included in the Vyutpatti, and the Amara Kosa, as meaning ‘vessel.’ It is of course out of the question that a word of the fifth century B. C. can be derived from either of them; but they are evidently the descendants of allied forms. Childers gives another form khalopī on the authority of the Abhidhāna Padīpikā (twelfth century), verse 456, where it occurs in a list of names of pots. Another—khaḷopi—is put in his text by Trenckner at Milinda, p.107, from one MS., but the other two differ. Both commentators paraphrase it here by ukkhali pacchi vā.
 Na Daṇḍa-m-antaraṃ. That is, perhaps, among the firewood; but the expression is not clear. The Commentaries only give the reason. Dr. Neumann (on Majjhima I, 77) has, ‘he does not spy beyond the lattice’ or perhaps ‘ beyond the bars of the grate’ (spahte nicht uber das Gitter), but this seems putting a great deal of meaning into the sticks, and not sufficiently reproducing the force of antaraṃ. And how can paṭigaṇhāti mean ‘spy’? We have, no doubt, to fill out an elliptical phrase. But it is just such cases as those in this paragraph where we are more likely to go right if we follow the ancient tradition.
 Na purisantara-gatāya. The commentators only give the reason. On the meaning of the word compare Jāt. I, 290.
 Na saṃkhittisu. Both meaning and derivation are uncertain. Dr. Neumann has ṅot from the dirty.’
 Thusodaka. It is not fermented. The traditional interpretation here is: ‘a drink called suvīrakaṃ (after the country Suvīra) made of the constituents, especially the husk, of all cereals.’ The use of salt sovīraka as a cure for wind in the stomach is mentioned at Mahā Vagga VI, 16. 3; and it was allowed, as a beverage, if mixed with water, to the Buddhist Bhikkhus. In Vimāna Vatthu XIX, 8 it is mentioned in a list of drinks given to them. Childers calls it ‘sour gruel’ following Subhūti in the first edition (1865) of the Abhidhāna Padīpikā (verse 460), but in the Abh. Pad. Sūci (published in 1893) Subhūti renders it ‘kongey’; something of the same sort as barley water. Buddhaghosa adds: ‘Every one agrees that it is wrong to drink intoxicants. These ascetics see sin even in this.’ The corresponding Sanskrit word, tusodaka, is found only in Suṣruta.
 Datti. A small pot,’ says Buddhaghosa, ‘ in which special titbits are put aside, and kept.’
 Sāmāka, not in Childers. See M. I, 156. Jāt. II, 365, III, 144.
 Daddula, not in Childers. See M. I, 78, 156, 188.
 Piññaka, not in Childers. See Vin. IV, 341. The commentators here merely say: ‘ This is plain.’
 Chava-dussāni pi dhāreti. The commentators give an alternative explanation: ‘ Clothing made of Eraka grass tied together.’ Was such clothing then used to wrap dead bodies in?
 Tirītāni pi dhāreti. This custom is referred to at Mahā Vagga VIII, 29, as having been there followed by ascetics. The use of such garments is there forbidden to the Bhikkhus.
 Ajinakkhipam pi dhāreti. Buddhaghosa gives here an explanation different from that given by him on Vin. III, 34 (quoted ‘Vinaya Texts,’ II, 247), where the word also occurs. The Puggala Paññatti gives both explanations as possible. Khipa at A. I, 33 means some sort of net. Ajinakkhipa is referred to at S. I, 117 as the characteristic dress of an old Brahman.
 Phalaka-cīram pi dhāreti. See Mahā Vagga VIII, 28. 2; Culla Vagga V, 29. 3.
 So of Ajita of the garment of hair, above, p. 73. Both commentators say the hair is human hair.
 Vāla-kambalam pi dhāreti. So the commentators here. The alternative rendering given by us at Vinaya Texts,’ II, 247, ‘skin of a wild beast,’ should be corrected accordingly. That would be vāḷa, and all the passages where our word occurs read vāla. Comp. A. I, 240.
 Ukkuṭikappadhāna. Compare Dhp. 141, 2 = Divy. 339. The commentator says he progressed in this posture by a series of hops. The posture is impossible to Europeans, who, if they crouch down on their heels, cannot keep their balance when the heels touch the ground. But natives of India will sit so for hours without fatigue.
 Both commentators add: ‘or stands, or walks up and down.’
 Thaṇḍila-seyyam pi kappeti. The Burmese MSS. and Buddhaghosa, but not the Siamese edition, read taṇḍila. So does my MS. at Dhp. 141. The Puggala omits the word. S. IV, 118, and Mil. 351 have the ṭh.
 Abbhokāsiko ca hoti. There is no comment on this. But compare Jāt. IV, 8; Mil. 342
 Vekaṭiko. So of an Ājīvaka at Jāt. I, 390, and compare ‘Vinaya Texts,’ II, 59. My rendering of the word at Mil. 259 ought, I think, to be corrected accordingly. But why was not this entered among the foods above, where one of them was already mentioned? It looks like an afterthought, or a gloss.
 Apānako. Compare my Milinda II, 85 foll. on this curious belief.
 That is, of course, a true recluse, an actual Arahat. Throughout these sections Gotama is purposely at cross purposes with his questioner. Kassapa uses the word Brāhmaṇa in his own sense; that is, not in the ordinary sense, but of the ideal religieux. Gotama, in his answer, keeps the word; but he means something quite different, he means an Arahat. On the persistent way in which the Piṭaka texts try to put this new meaning into the word, see above, in the Introduction to the Kūṭadanta.
 This paragraph, like the last and like the next, is, in the Pāli, broken up into three sections, one for each of the three lists of penances.
 ‘And by this,’ says Buddhaghosa, ‘he means Arahatship. For the doctrine of the Exalted One has Arahatship as its end.’
 At Aṅguttara II, 200 (compare M. I, 240-242) it is said that those addicted to tapo-jigucchā are incapable of Arahatship. Gotama must either, therefore, be here referring to his years of penance before he attained Nirvāṇa under the Tree of Wisdom; or he must be putting a new meaning into the expression, and taking ‘the higher scrupulousness’ in the sense of the self-control of the Path. Probably both are implied.
Jigucchā is translated by Childers as ‘disgust, loathing,’ following the Sanskrit dictionaries. The example of it given at M. I, 78 is ‘being so mindful, in going out or coming in, that pity is stirred up in one even towards a drop of water, to the effect that: “may I not bring injury on the minute creatures therein.” It comes therefore to very nearly the same thing as ahiṃsā.
 Adhipaññā. From Aṅguttara II, 93 it is clear that this is the wisdom of the higher stages only of the Path, not of Arahatship. For the man who has adhipaññā has then to strive on till he attains to Arahatship. Puggala Paññatti IV, 26 is not really inconsistent with this.
 The whole conversation will be translated below. It forms the subject of the Udumbarīka Sīhanāda Suttanta, No. 25 in the Dīgha.
 According to the rule laid down in Vinaya I, 69.
 That is, Arahatship, Nirvāṇa.
 The Burmese MSS. call it the Mahā Sīhanāda Sutta, which is also the name given in the MSS. to the Twelfth Sutta in the Majjhima—called there in the text (p. 83) and in the Milinda (P.396), the Lomahaṃsana Pariyāya. We have had an instance above (p.55) of several different names being given, in the text itself, to the same Sutta. And I had already, in 1880, called attention in my ‘Buddhist Birth Stories’ (pp. lx, lxi) to the numerous instances in the Jātaka Book of the same Jātaka being known, in the collection itself, by different names. It is evident that the titles were considered a very secondary matter.